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Abstract  
The 2000 censuses show that the proportion of women below age 30 who are mothers 
has dropped substantially in most Latin America countries, suggesting that the social 
imperative of early motherhood, which has long prevailed in the region, is 
weakening. Surveys conducted in 14 Latin American countries in 2006 also show a 
strong link between childlessness and higher education across several cohorts. We 
discuss whether the recent increase in childlessness among young women reflects a 
shift towards later childbearing, a novel trend in the Latin American context, and also 
whether it may signal an emerging retreat from universal childbearing in the region. 
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1. Introduction  
Latin America is quickly approaching fertility replacement levels. Although the pace of 
fertility decline has been uneven across countries4 (Guzmán et al. 1996), recent data 
show that more than half of the 20 Latin American countries had total fertility rates 
(TFR) close to or below replacement levels by 2005 (Population Reference Bureau 
2007). This group includes the four largest countries in the region: Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, and Argentina; as well as five countries with populations that have already 
crossed the replacement threshold (with TFR lower than 2.1): Uruguay, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. Fertility patterns and trends at these low levels may be 
strongly determined by women’s behavior in entering maternity; that is, by rates of first 
births and age schedules. If motherhood continues to be almost universal and early, it 
seems unlikely that the region will eventually reach the very low fertility levels 
observed in several European and East Asian countries (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 
2002). Conversely, if larger proportions of Latin Americans opt to have their first child 
at older ages, or to remain childless, the region could reach very low fertility levels 
sooner rather than later. 
Until now, a distinctive feature of the process of fertility decline in Latin America 
was that it took place without major changes in the onset of family formation, as 
indicated by fairly stable rates and ages at first union and first birth (Rosero-Bixby 
1996, 2004, Mensch, Singh, and Casterline 2005). It seems, however, that Latin 
America has entered into a new stage of the fertility decline process in recent years. The 
proportion of women under 30 who have made the transition to motherhood has 
dropped significantly in most Latin American countries in the past decade. In Costa 
Rica, for example, the estimated proportion of women who would be mothers by age 
30, according to the rates of the study year, fell from above 80% to about 65% from 
1995 to 2005. Drawing on the European experience, this article discusses whether this 
reduction in rates of motherhood among young adults reflects a novel shift in the 
starting age of childbearing, an emerging retreat from universal childbearing, or a 
combination of both. 
The study of childlessness among younger groups adds a complementary 
perspective to earlier research. Previous studies on childlessness in developing 
countries have been traditionally confined to the end of the reproductive span; i.e., 
among women in the oldest reproductive age groups, usually over age 40. Based on the 
                                                          
4 For example, Mexico and Brazil have experienced a rapid and sharp fertility transition over the last thirty 
years; Chile, Uruguay and Argentina already displayed a relatively low level of fertility in the 1970s and the 
reduction in fertility rates has been moderate thereafter. In Guatemala, Bolivia, Honduras, Paraguay and 
Nicaragua, fertility rates remain relatively high at present (United Nations 2007). 
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assumption that the desire for children is practically universal in developing countries, 
childlessness has been typically attributed to involuntary infecundity. The comparison 
of data from the World Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and Health Surveys 
reveals that permanent childlessness has diminished in Latin America since the 1970s 
(United Nations 2004). However, the proportion of childless women aged 25 to 49 has 
recently increased in several countries of the region (Rutstein and Shah 2004), 
suggesting that childbearing is intentionally postponed (or foregone) by an increasing 
proportion of young adults.  
This article documents the levels and trends of childlessness among young adult 
women in 16 Latin American countries between 1970 and 2000 with data from four 
waves of population censuses. It also identifies factors that are associated with 
childlessness using individual-level data from a 2006 series of surveys conducted in 14 
Latin American countries. The article focuses primarily on cohort fertility, given that it 
has been shown that period indicators of fertility may be distorted by what Ryder called 
“demographic translation” effects (Ryder 1964), also known as tempo effects in more 
recent literature (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998). For example, while period total fertility 
rates are as low as 1.2 and 1.3 in several European countries, the lowest estimates of 
complete cohort fertility in those countries are in the order of 1.5 to 1.7 births among 
cohorts born circa 1970 (Sardon 2006). The persistent postponement of births biases 
downwards the estimates of period fertility rates because there can be a recuperation of 
fertility at older ages. However, it is well documented that, in general, “later means 
fewer” children (Rindfuss and Bumpass 1976), or even no children. 
 
 
1.1. The Latin American demographic context  
Considering the far-reaching economic, social, and political transformations that Latin 
America experienced in the second half of the 20th century, it remains somewhat of a 
puzzle that demographic indicators of family formation, such as age at first union and 
age at first birth, have shown, until very recently, so little change (Heaton, Forste, and 
Otterstrom 2002). During these past decades, major structural transformations affected 
the organization of society, particularly the expansion of mass education, rapid 
urbanization, and internal rural to urban migration, as well as the transition to 
democratic governments in the political domain. Women’s education and employment 
levels, which are known to influence family formation, also increased rapidly during 
this period. For example, the participation of women in the labor force increased from 
around 20% in the 1950s to over 50% in the 1990s, albeit with large differences 
according to country, area of residence, age and educational level  (ECLAC 2007). The 
increase was particularly sharp after the debt crisis that affected the region in the 1980s, 
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and the subsequent economic restructuring of the 1990s. The deterioration of the 
economy, increasing unemployment, and precarious attachment to the labour force 
rendered the traditional male breadwinner family model unsustainable (Jelin and Díaz-
Muñoz 2003). Despite these trends, early life course transitions, such as the transition to 
first union and motherhood, changed remarkably little (Fussell 2005). 
Fertility in the Latin American region as a whole declined from 5.9 births per 
woman in 1950-1955 to 2.5 in 2000-2005 (United Nations 2007). However, as 
mentioned above, this rapid and sustained process of fertility decline was not 
accompanied by a gradual delay in the onset of childbearing, as has been the norm in 
European countries (Sobotka 2004). In the early 1990s, relatively low fertility coexisted 
with traditional patterns of family formation –i.e., early nuptiality and young 
motherhood– in many Latin American countries. Fussell and Palloni (2004) argue that 
the explanation for this distinct Latin American pattern5 lies in the strong cultural 
emphasis on family ties. According to these authors, the value placed on family 
networks, which represent the primary safety net guarding against economic and social 
instability, would explain the persistence of nearly universal and early family 
formation, despite major changes in the economic, political, and social spheres. 
Traditional patterns are, however, not immutable, and it is reasonable to expect 
that behavior regarding motherhood will eventually change in the face of modernizing 
forces, such as women’s education and salaried work, particularly when the average 
desired family size has declined to about two children in most Latin American countries 
(Westoff and Bankole 2002). Younger cohorts, particularly if they have had access to 
higher education, are likely to reach adulthood with different aspirations regarding 
marriage and family, work life, economic self-sufficiency, and lifestyle than their 
mothers and grandmothers, as has occurred in Western societies (Crimmins, Easterlin 
and Saito 1991). Delaying childbearing could be a suitable strategy that allows them to 
pursue higher education, establish themselves in the labour market, build their couple 
relationship before child-rearing, and also to deal with unstable life conditions or 
uncertainty in the economic context (Adsera and Menéndez 2006). 
 
 
                                                          
5 Fertility patterns in Eastern Europe also reflect the atypical coexistence of very low fertility and early 
transition to childbearing, but an upward trend towards later motherhood has recently started (Council of 
Europe 2005). 
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2. Data and methods  
Drawing on the classic study of the decline of fertility in Europe that decomposed 
childbearing into marriage and marital fertility indexes (Coale and Watkins 1986), the 
starting point in this article is the following identity that decomposes total fertility F 
into two different processes:  
 
(1) the proportion of women who became mothers, or motherhood rate M, and  
(2) the fertility of mothers, or G rate, which is simply the additional number of 
children that mothers have:   
)1( += GMF  
Our trend analysis is based on cohort estimates of F and M from the four waves of 
censuses conducted in 16 Latin American countries since 1970. The G rate is derived 
from the above identity. We focus on M at ages 25-29, which the data shows represents 
87% (5% SD) of complete M in Latin America (cohorts in these data reach complete M 
by age 40). And we focus on G in the age bracket 30-34, which includes 80% (5% SD) 
of complete G in each cohort. In some analyses, we estimate complete M and G for 
cohorts born in the 1970s from the quasi-complete figures at ages 25-29 and 30-34, 
respectively, using relations derived from the data. The census data were taken from 
several sources, including the UN Demographic Yearbook, as well as online census 
data on the web from the IPUMS project (Minnesota Population Center 2008), the 
University of Costa Rica (CCP 2008), and the census offices in Colombia, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.  
This decomposition of fertility in M and G was used in an earlier study of the 
prospects of below-replacement fertility in 15 metropolitan areas of Latin America 
(Rosero-Bixby 2004).  For comparison purposes, we also use the most recent estimates 
of cohorts M and G for 22 European countries, which correspond to the cohorts born 
circa 1970. The lowest estimates of cohort total fertility in this group of European 
countries are in the order of 1.5 to 1.7 births. The estimates come from the European 
Demographic Observatory (Sardon 2006), and the countries are: Austria, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden (countries with no available estimates for 1970s 
cohorts were not considered). In addition, we use published cohort estimates of 
completed-M and M at age 27 for five cohorts in 23 developed countries (Frejka and 
Sardon 2007) to identify an intra-cohort relationship between these two figures, which  
we then use to estimate a scenario of completed-M in the 1970s birth cohorts in Latin 
America. 
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In order to examine in more detail recent trends in motherhood rates, we use vital 
statistics data on first births in Chile and Costa Rica in the period 1980-2006. These are 
the only countries in the region with accessible and reliable series of numbers of births 
by birth order. We estimate the time series of period-M at age 30 (sum of age specific 
first birth rates), as well as the period median age at motherhood (i.e., when 50% of 
women reach motherhood) in these two countries. 
In complementary analyses of factors associated with childlessness, we use micro-
data from surveys conducted in 14 Latin American countries in 2006 as part of the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2008) of the “Americas Barometer” of 
the Vanderbilt University6. These are nationally representative surveys of adult women 
and men aged 18 and over, with a sample size of around 1,500 in each country. The 
questions mainly focus on political themes, such as voting participation, tolerance, and 
support of democracy, and citizens’ rights. However, by including questions on the 
number of children and socioeconomic status, these surveys offer a rare opportunity for 
comparing the co-factors of the prevalence of childlessness in several cohorts and 
across 14 Latin American countries. Using logistic regression, this article estimates 
cross-sectional effects on the probability of being childless, contrasting results across 
three age or cohort groups (women aged 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49 in 2006). The 
covariates included in the model are: urban residence, educational level, occupation, 
household wealth (a zero to one scale built by counting up to 11 household assets), 
religion and religiosity, trust in neighbors (an indicator of social capital measured with a 
zero to one scale), satisfaction with life (an indicator of self- perceived wellbeing 
measured with a zero to one scale), and sources of news, since some authors postulate 
an important role of television (telenovelas, in particular) for the diffusion of modern 
lifestyles and family values in Latin America (Potter, Schmertmann, and Cavenaghi 
2002). Age and marital status are included as controls, and interactions between age and 
several covariates are also explored. 
 
 
3. Results  
Figure 1 (Part B) shows the remarkable drop in the G rate or fertility of mothers from 
cohorts aged 30 to 34 in the 1970 wave of censuses (born around 1940), to analogous 
cohorts in the 2000 censuses born around 1970. At these ages, about 80% of the final G 
fertility of the cohort is usually completed in Latin America. The oldest cohorts were at  
 
                                                          
6 The countries are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. 
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Figure 1: M proportion and G rate in Latin American countries over four  
 census waves 
 
.6 .7 .8 .9 1
Guatemala
Nicaragua
Dominican Rep
Paraguay
Honduras
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Panama
Mexico
Venezuela
Peru
Chile
Colombia
Brasil
Uruguay
Argentina
M proportion
A. Motherhood M at ages 25-29
Census wave: 2000 1990 1980 1970
1 2 3 4 5 6
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Peru
Mexico
Ecuador
Dominican Rep
Panama
Venezuela
Costa Rica
Argentina
Brasil
Colombia
Uruguay
Chile
G births
B. Mothers' cohort fertility G at ages 30-34
 
http://www.demographic-research.org 175 
Rosero-Bixby et al.: Is Latin America starting to retreat from early and universal childbearing? 
their peak reproductive ages in the 1960s, and the youngest cohorts reached these ages 
in the 1990s. Most countries went from a G rate of four or five children to a rate of 
around two children in these 30 years. The exceptions are, on the one hand, Argentina 
and Uruguay, which already had G rates of about two births from 1970 onwards; and, 
on the other hand, Honduras and Guatemala, the only countries with G rates higher than 
three births in 2000. 
Trends are different in the proportion M of motherhood in the 25-29 age bracket 
(Figure 1, Part A), when close to 90% of the final cohort-M is usually completed in 
Latin America. First, there is no clear pattern of change from 1970 to 1990. In some 
countries, such as Chile and Peru, there are declines of about 10 percentage points in M, 
whereas in most countries, including the four regional giants, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina 
and Colombia, the M change from 1970 to 1990 is only about two percentage points in 
any direction. In contrast, between the last two waves of censuses, from 1990 to 2000, 
there is a clear drop in M in almost all countries. With the exceptions of the Dominican 
Republic and Paraguay, the M proportion reached its historic low in the 2000 wave of 
censuses. 
Period indicators of M illustrate these trends more sharply. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution over time in the period-M at age 30 and the period median age of entry into 
motherhood in Chile and Costa Rica, the only Latin American countries with readily 
available series that are sufficiently long. Three points emerge from Figure 2:  
 
(1) there are no clear trends before 1990;  
(2) starting in about 1990, there is a clear increase of almost three years in the 
median age at first birth over a period of about 10 years; and  
(3) there is a sharp drop of almost 20 percentage points in M in the decade of 
1990.  
 
The M proportion of mothers is below 65% at the end of the series. Considering that, in 
the past, no more than 10% of women entered motherhood after age 30, this might 
imply that as many as one in four women could end her reproductive life childless. This 
is, however, a naïve interpretation of a period-M that may be down-biased by the shift 
in tempo of first birth. It is plausible that women will enter motherhood after age 30 in 
significantly higher proportions than in the past if recent changes are driven mostly by a 
temporal postponement of the first birth. 
Returning to the census-based cohort estimates of G and M, in order to include 
younger cohorts (born in the 1970s) in trend analyses, we completed the final 10 years 
of the G rate for cohorts born around 1970 (observed until about age 32), as well as the  
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Figure 2: Trend in motherhood proportion at age 30 and median age  
 at motherhood. Period rates in Costa Rica and Chile 
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final 10 years of the M proportion for women born around 1975 (observed until about 
age 27 in the 2000 wave of censuses). To complete the cohort G rate, we estimated a 
simple regression model with G in the same cohort 10 years earlier as the predictor 
variable, using fixed effects estimates in the panel of 16 Latin American countries. The 
resulting equation for a cohort c was (standard errors in parentheses): 
 
92.0R                   (0.07)   (0.20)             
145.1335.0
234304440 =
×+= −− cc GG  
 
To complete M, we followed the same procedure as Frejka and Sardon (2007), and 
assumed that the rate in the coming 10 years would be the same as in the previous 10-
year period in the same country and ages. However, this assumption corresponds to a 
traditional scenario in which very low proportions of women commence childbearing in 
their thirties, which had been the pattern until recently. It is quite plausible that women 
in younger cohorts who did not start childbearing in their twenties will do so in their 
thirties, resulting in substantially higher rates of late transition to motherhood similar to 
those seen in Europe. We thus assumed, as an alternative scenario, that young Latin 
American cohorts will display the same behavior as their European counterparts. Based 
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on this assumption, we completed the M proportion with a relationship derived from the 
panel data for 23 countries and five cohorts in the Frejka and Sardon (2007) article, 
Tables 1 and 3. The resulting European equation, estimated with a fixed effect 
regression model in the logits, for a cohort c was7: 
 
55.0            (0.97)    (0.69)                         
953.3426.0)(logit
2
27 =
×+−=
R
MM ccfinal  
 
Figure 3 shows the box plots8 for complete G and M in the 16 Latin American 
countries and in each of the four census waves, plus our prediction for the wave of 2010 
(two scenarios for M). These are cohort estimates of quasi-complete G and M, which 
will be observed in the census wave of 2010 for the 1970 cohorts. The figure also 
includes boxes of G and M for 22 European countries, with available estimates for 
cohorts born around 1970. It also shows the M box in the hypothetical scenario that the 
1975 cohort would complete M with high rates of late motherhood, like in Europe. 
Overall, this figure confirms the precipitous decline in G from cohorts born around 
1930 (median of 5.7 births) to those born around 1960 (median of 2.6 births). This 
decline has somehow stalled for the cohorts born about 1970 (median 2.3 births) at a 
level well above the European median of about one birth per mother in the 1970 
cohorts.  
For the complete M proportion –the main focus in this article–no clear trend can be 
seen when we move from the 1935 cohorts to the 1965 cohorts. The median M hovers 
above 90% motherhood, although in the 1965 cohorts there are signs that a decline has 
started. In contrast, the cohorts born by 1975 seem to be heading towards lower M 
(median of 86%), close to the M level in the European cohorts of 1970 (median of 
83%). However, as indicated by the dashed box in the figure, if the 1975 cohorts have 
been simply delaying the onset of childbearing, and can be expected to have their first 
birth in their thirties, as in Europe, complete-M (median of 91%) will change little, and 
will stay above 90% median value. In this scenario, the only change will therefore be in 
the age at first birth. Reality may follow a path between these two scenarios, with a 
median M between 86% and 91%. Colombia is an extreme case, showing large 
differences between the two scenarios. Only 70% of women aged 25-29 were mothers 
in the 2005 census (our 1975 birth cohort), compared to 82% of the 1965 cohort in the  
 
                                                          
7 Since the R-squared of 0.55 in the prediction equation is less than optimal for forecasting purposes, we 
consider this as just an alternative scenario. 
8 The line in the middle of the box indicates the median value of the distribution; the extremes of the box 
indicate the 25 and 75 percentiles. 
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Figure 3: Trend in the approximately final G and M in five cohorts of 16 Latin  
 American countries and in the 1970 cohort of 22 European countries 
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1993 census. Our estimates of the completed M for the 1975 cohort range from 77%, if 
we assume the continuation of the 1965 cohort first birth rates, to 90%, if we assume 
the adoption of first birth patterns similar to those of Europe. 
To what extent are M and G related to each other? Is fertility of second and higher 
order births influenced by the rate of entrance into motherhood? Lower M usually 
means later age at first birth and a reduced exposure time for having second and higher 
order births. This exposure effect would be strong in a natural fertility setting. But even 
under perfectly controlled fertility conditions, later may mean fewer births, particularly 
for the tail of the age distribution of women who start childbearing by age 40. However, 
if a lower M comes from a retreat from reproduction by large numbers of couples, 
further fertility of those who choose to have children may or may not be lower than in 
the previous situation, in which women with low fertility desires were part of the pool 
of mothers. If there is a general reduction in fertility preferences, a reduced M will go 
hand-in-hand with a reduced G. If, however, in some societies there is a divide between 
couples who opt out of parenthood and couples more oriented towards family and 
children, we will not observe an association between G and M, or the association may 
even be inverse. 
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Figure 4 shows the cross-sectional associations between the national levels of M 
and G in five successive Latin American cohorts and a recent European cohort. It is 
clear from the figure that the association between these two fertility components has 
changed over time. If we exclude the outliers Argentina and Uruguay from cohorts born 
in the 1930s and 1940s, there is almost no association between G and M in these 
cohorts. A positive and clear association takes shape in more recent generations of 
women, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s cohorts. However, the association weakens 
in the 1970s cohorts9. Moreover, an inverse relationship can be observed in the 1970s 
European cohorts: in societies with a lower proportion of women who are mothers, the  
fertility of mothers tends to be higher. This inverse association seems peculiar at first. 
However, it may simply mean that when M falls below a certain threshold, those 
women with lower fertility preferences are removed from the pool of mothers; that is, 
women who would have one child at most may be the ones who opt out of motherhood, 
leaving a self-selected group of women with higher fertility preferences in the pool of 
mothers, which, consequently, results in a higher G-rate. 
What factors increase the likelihood of being childless (even if only temporarily) 
among young adults? Do these factors act differently than in earlier cohorts? Table 1 
shows the results of a multivariate analysis on the probability of being childless among 
the 9,000 respondents of the LAPOP surveys of the Americas Barometer 2006. We 
present separate models for all women aged 20-49, and for each of the 10-year age 
brackets; i.e., for 10-year cohorts with central birth years at 1980, 1970, and 1960. All 
models include controls for age and country.  
As expected, there is a clear and positive effect of education on childlessness 
(Castro-Martín and Juarez 1995). College-educated women are about four times more 
likely to be childless than women with no education or incomplete elementary school. 
This effect does not differ much in young and old cohorts. Working women, in turn, are 
twice as likely as housewives to be childless, but this effect is present and significant 
only in younger cohorts. However, the direction of causality in this relationship cannot 
be determined from the available data; i.e., we cannot tell whether women are childless 
because they are in the labor force, or whether they are more likely to be in the labor 
force because they are childless. Women who get the news mostly from newspapers are 
more likely to be childless, whereas the opposite occurs among women who get the 
news mostly from TV. The model does not show clear effects on childlessness based on 
residence in urban or metropolitan areas once we control for education, or from the 
indicators of social capital in the community (measured by the trust scale). Contrary to  
 
                                                          
9 The scatter graph for the 1970 cohort M that was predicted with the European relationship differs little from 
the one shown in Figure 4. The correlation coefficient is 0.70, compared to 0.71 in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Cross-sectional relationships between G and M. Latin American (LA)  
 countries cohorts 1930-1970 and Europe cohort 1970 
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the popular view that religious affiliation and church attendance have a strong influence 
on women’s fertility behavior in Latin America, our data show no effect of these factors 
on childlessness.  
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Table 1: Logistic regressions on the probability of being childless. 
 LAPOP-2006 surveys, in 14 Latin American countries 
 
 Total Age 20-29 Age 30-39 Age 40-49 
Explanatory variables 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
(N) (8,925)  (3,717)  (2,802)  (2,406)  
Marital status          
 With no couple 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref. 
 Common law union 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.00 
 Married 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00 
Place of residence          
 Metropolitan 0.89 0.29 0.77 0.07 1.15 0.58 1.22 0.50 
 Other Urban 0.80 0.07 0.77 0.09 1.13 0.66 0.59 0.16 
 Rural 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref. 
Education          
 Incomplete elementary 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref. 
 Completed elementary 1.44 0.04 1.24 0.36 1.66 0.17 1.82 0.12 
 High school 1.70 0.00 1.70 0.01 1.58 0.15 1.78 0.10 
 College 3.72 0.00 4.06 0.00 3.61 0.00 5.19 0.00 
Occupation          
 Housewife 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref. 
 White-collar / student 2.03 0.00 2.69 0.00 1.26 0.32 0.94 0.83 
 Blue-collar 1.48 0.00 1.71 0.00 1.11 0.63 1.37 0.21 
Religion          
 Catholic 1 Ref. 1.00 Ref. 1 Ref. 1 Ref. 
 No Catholic 1.08 0.45 1.21 0.13 0.74 0.20 1.17 0.55 
 No religion 1.03 0.83 1.26 0.25 0.79 0.51 0.55 0.34 
Church attendance          
 Weekly vs. less than weekly 1.09 0.30 1.11 0.33 0.82 0.28 1.28 0.27 
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Table 1: (Continued) 
 
 Total Age 20-29 Age 30-39 Age 40-49 
Explanatory variables 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Odds 
Ratio P>|z| 
Trust scale (0 - 1) 1.08 0.55 1.07 0.70 0.84 0.53 1.25 0.54 
TV informed scale  (0 - 1) 0.62 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.66 0.18 0.77 0.48 
Paper informed scale  (0 - 1) 1.42 0.01 1.37 0.06 1.47 0.16 1.43 0.29 
Satisfied with life scale (0 - 1)  2.26 0.00 2.23 0.00 1.63 0.17 0.71 0.44 
Wealth scale (0 - 1) 2.85 0.00 2.97 0.00 4.33 0.00 0.31 0.05 
Age groups and interactions          
 20-29 1 Ref.        
 30-39 1.22 0.62        
 40-49 9.43 0.00        
 Life satisfaction and          
  Age 30-39 0.58 0.17        
  Age 40-49 0.35 0.02        
 Wealth and          
  Age 30-39 1.23 0.61        
  Age 40-49 0.24 0.00             
 
Note: All regressions included controls for age (continuous) and country (13 dummy variables). 
Source: LAPOP surveys project data online at http://encuestas.ccp.ucr.ac.cr/Lapop.html 
 
 
The effects on childlessness of the scales of wealth and satisfaction with life 
deserve a closer look. The odds ratios show that the direction of these effects reversed 
in younger cohorts.  This change of direction is statistically significant, as shown by the 
interaction effects included in the all ages model. The findings indicate that women who 
are wealthier or more satisfied with life are less likely to be childless in older cohorts, 
and are more likely to be childless in younger cohorts. Among younger women, going 
from zero to one on the wealth scale increases the odds of being childless almost 
threefold, whereas among older cohorts, it reduces the odds to about one-third. 
Regarding satisfaction with life, going from zero to one on the scale more than doubles 
the odds of being childless among younger women, and reduces the odds by 30% 
among older women. If these were truly cohort effects, as opposed to age effects, they 
would stand for a dramatic generational change: childlessness now seems linked to 
happiness and wealth, in contrast to the trends seen only a generation ago, in which 
childless women reported being less happy and less wealthy. Nevertheless, we should 
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interpret these cross-sectional relationships with caution because of possible reverse 
causality and the confounding effects of age and cohort. 
Figure 5 re-examines the robust effect of education on the motherhood proportion 
M among women aged 25-29 using data from the two most recent censuses in nine 
Latin American countries. The educational gap in M is large and persistent over time. 
Having a college education seems particularly important for two reasons: (1) the M gap 
for college is larger than for lower educational levels, and (2) college-educated women 
are the only group with a clear reduction in M over time in the nine countries. In Costa 
Rica, for example, only 43% of women aged 25-29 who attended college are mothers in 
the 2000 census, compared to 76% and 84% of women with high school and primary 
education, respectively. Moreover, in this country, the proportion of mothers among 
college-educated women fell 15 percentage points from the 1984 to the 2000 census, 
whereas the M proportion remained fairly stable in the other two educational groups. 
Among college-educated women, M dropped 14 percentage points in Panama, 11 points 
in Mexico, nine points in Colombia, seven points in Argentina and Brazil, five points in 
Nicaragua, and one point in Venezuela.  
Therefore, the fall in the M proportion among women with college education 
seems to be a key factor in understanding the emerging retreat from childbearing in 
Latin America observed in recent years. Another key factor in understanding this trend 
is the growing numbers of women receiving a college education. In the age bracket 25-
29, the percentage of women who attended college increased in the last two censuses by 
18 points in Chile; 15 points in Colombia; 10 points in Venezuela; eight points in 
Argentina, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua; but only one to three points in Panama, Brazil, 
and Mexico (Table 2). In the 2000 wave of censuses, college-educated women in this 
age bracket range from low levels of 11% in Brazil and 14% in Mexico and Nicaragua, 
to highs of 32% in Argentina and Chile, and 27% in Colombia and Venezuela. 
In a quick exercise to estimate the impact of the changing educational composition 
on M, we computed for the nine countries in Figure 5 a hypothetical M for the 2000 
census wave, assuming that the educational composition was that of the 1990 census 
wave. The result of this exercise is presented in Table 2, and suggests that educational 
improvement might be responsible for all of the observed national change in M in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela; and for about half of the M change in 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Nicaragua. In other words, about half the decline in 
M in these four countries (and 80% in Panama) comes from M reductions within 
educational groups, mostly among women with a college education, meaning that 
factors other than the improvement in women’s education may also need to be 
considered if we are to fully understand the recent decline in M. 
 
184  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Demographic Research: Volume 20, Article 9 
Figure 5: Motherhood proportion M at age 25-29 by education in the two most  
 recent censuses, selected countries 
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If the recent enhancement in women’s education explains a significant portion of 
the recent drop in the percentage of women who become mothers, why then did past 
educational improvements not produce a similar result? The answer might be that 
educational improvements in the past occurred mostly at the primary and secondary 
levels and, as Figure 5 suggests, in most countries there are only small differences in M 
at these lower educational levels. It is college education that seems to make a difference 
in the timing and level of transition to motherhood. 
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Table 2: Educational composition and M proportion in women aged 25-29  
 in the two most recent censuses 
 
  Educational composition of women M proportion 
Country 
year 
None/ 
elementary 
High 
school College Total  
None / 
elementary 
High 
school College Total 
Argentina          
 1991 50 25 25 100  0.81 0.65 0.43 0.67 
 2001 38 30 32 100  0.85 0.65 0.36 0.63 
 Percent M-change explained by education     100 
Brazil          
 1991 67 23 10 100  0.80 0.59 0.38 0.71 
 2000 60 29 11 100  0.82 0.58 0.31 0.69 
 Percent M-change explained by education     100 
Chile          
 1992 37 48 15 100  0.86 0.77 0.51 0.76 
 2002 23 45 32 100  0.88 0.81 0.47 0.72 
 Percent M-change explained by education     100 
Colombia          
 1993 56 32 12 100  0.89 0.81 0.51 0.82 
 2005 26 47 27 100  0.85 0.78 0.43 0.70 
 Percent M-change explained by education     63 
Costa Rica          
 1984 52 34 14 100  0.85 0.76 0.58 0.78 
 2000 48 31 21 100  0.84 0.76 0.43 0.73 
 Percent M-change explained by education     51 
Mexico          
 1990 56 32 12 100  0.87 0.74 0.50 0.78 
 2000 39 47 14 100  0.85 0.74 0.39 0.73 
 Percent M-change explained by education     51 
Nicaragua          
 1995 58 35 7 100  0.90 0.82 0.57 0.85 
 2005 52 34 14 100  0.88 0.81 0.52 0.80 
 Percent M-change explained by education     50 
Panama          
 1990 32 46 21 100  0.91 0.84 0.58 0.81 
 2000 31 45 24 100  0.89 0.81 0.44 0.75 
 Percent M-change explained by education     19 
Venezuela          
 1990 54 29 17 100  0.88 0.74 0.45 0.76 
 2001 46 27 27 100  0.88 0.76 0.44 0.73 
 Percent M-change explained by education     100 
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4. Discussion  
This article documents the growing proportion of Latin American women in their 
twenties and early thirties who have not made the transition to motherhood. This 
emerging trend certainly means a shift in the region toward a later onset of 
childbearing, but it could also mean that some women are choosing to forgo having 
children. Until recently, one of the singular demographic features of the region was that 
rapid and sustained fertility decline occurred without a concomitant change in the 
timing of union formation, or in the onset of childbearing. Early and almost universal 
childbearing persisted in spite of radical changes in the demographic, economic, social, 
and political spheres. There is, however, recent evidence that young cohorts are 
departing from this traditional pattern, and that Latin American women are waiting 
longer to become mothers. Although age at first birth had remained fairly stable since 
the 1970s, the data presented from the 2000 wave of censuses reveals that the 
proportion of women aged 25 to 29 who are still childless increased in almost all the 
countries analyzed. Data from vital statistics for Chile and Costa Rica also corroborate 
this new trend towards later motherhood.  
The emerging trend in postponement of childbearing raises the question of whether 
this development will lead to an increase in the region in permanent childlessness –
voluntarily chosen or because of age-related infecundity– as has been the case in 
European countries countries (González and Jurado-Guerrero 2006, Tanturri and 
Mencarini 2008). Our estimates of the proportion of women born in 1975 who will 
eventually become mothers are not conclusive: an important drop could take place if 
these women follow the traditional pattern of low rates of transition to motherhood 
beyond age 30, but no significant drop would take place if there is a recovery with high 
rates of transition to motherhood among women in their thirties, as in many European 
countries. Nevertheless, the increase in childlessness in the customarily prime ages of 
reproduction (25 to 29), even if transitory, deserves attention. It signals an important 
change in societies where the social imperative of motherhood has been traditionally 
strong, and where women who wished to postpone their first birth or remain childless 
were commonly stigmatized as selfish. Latin American cultural constructions of 
femininity have been strongly influenced by women’s symbolic and social roles as 
mothers (Jelin 1990). Nowadays, motherhood continues to play a central role in 
women’s lives, but there has been an expansion of women’s non-familial identities and 
roles, possibly rendering the deferment of childbearing an acceptable option.  
Beyond the normative context, economic constraints and competing opportunities 
are also likely to play a major role in shaping decisions and behaviors regarding 
childbearing. In the face of enhanced female labor market prospects, increased 
economic insecurity, or rising conjugal instability, delayed childbearing might become 
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an increasingly common strategy for dealing with uncertainty, as has occurred in 
Europe (Billari, Liefbroer, and Philipov 2006). The impact of economic instability on 
family formation, as well as variations in the perception, tolerance, and reactions to 
economic insecurity across educational strata and social contexts, deserve further 
attention (Bernardi, Klärner, and Lippe 2008). 
It is not evident whether these changes should be interpreted under the lens of the 
second demographic transition (van de Kaa 1987). The validity of that framework to 
explain recent family changes in Latin America is at the center of contemporary debates 
(Quilodrán 1999, García and Rojas 2001). Divergent views persist on whether to 
interpret recent family dynamics as an outcome of diffusion processes of new cultural 
patterns, or as a reflection of the lack of social cohesion within excluded sectors 
(Arriagada  2002). Some demographic features of Latin American societies, such as the 
high prevalence of consensual unions or frequent union disruption, can be linked to 
either modernity or tradition, depending on the social group we focus on (Castro-Martín 
2002). The delayed onset of childbearing can, however, be unequivocally labelled as 
innovative behavior. Furthermore, our education-specific trend analysis has shown that 
it is precisely the highly educated strata who have taken the lead in this behavioral 
change. In fact, a great deal of the overall increase in childlessness among young adults 
is due to the upgraded educational composition of the population. We argue that major 
educational improvements in the past did not have a comparable impact on the timing 
of motherhood because they were focused on the universalization of primary education. 
In contrast, the more recent expansion of secondary education, and of college education 
in particular, is becoming a powerful force in restructuring the transition to adulthood 
and, consequently, the process of family formation (Grant and Furstenberg 2007). Yet 
in some countries, there is more to delayed fertility than a shift in the educational 
distribution of the population. In Nicaragua, Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia, and 
Panama, for example, we have documented significant changes in the proportion of 
mothers within educational strata or, more precisely, within the college-educated group. 
The multivariate analysis of a recent survey across 14 Latin American countries 
also reveals that high educational attainment is the most influential factor predicting 
childlessness among women of all ages. Hence, although our data do not allow us to 
link the recent increase in childlessness at young adulthood to “post-materialist” values 
(Lesthaeghe and Moors 1995, van de Kaa 2001), such as the search for individual 
autonomy or gender equality, the fact that highly educated women are the main 
protagonists of the observed trend points towards a change in values and competing life 
priorities that discourage early childbearing. 
It is not certain whether a delayed childbearing pattern will spread across the entire 
population. Latin America continues to display some of the highest levels of inequality 
in the world (Portes and Hoffman 2003), and the social processes that bring about 
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family change in different social strata remain quite heterogeneous. Furthermore, the 
large socioeconomic divide that characterizes many Latin American societies may act 
as an insurmountable barrier against the diffusion of social values regarding family, 
parenthood, and the optimal calendar for adulthood transitions. Yet it seems clear that 
the social imperative of early motherhood that prevailed during most of the 20th 
century has started to weaken, and that we are witnessing an increasing de-
standardization of the life course. 
There are multiple areas in which this research could be expanded in the future. 
One logical extension is to test cohort differentials regarding the timing and the 
determinants of the transition to motherhood within a life course framework, using 
retrospective birth histories from survey data. The problem is that, since childbearing 
postponement is an emerging trend, it might be visible only in recent data, and not 
many Latin American countries have conducted demographic surveys in recent years. 
An additional direction for analysis would be to examine the prevalence and correlates 
of childlessness among men, since socio-cultural expectations and competing 
opportunities shaping attitudes, decisions, and fertility behavior are fundamentally 
gendered.  
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